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“In whose Interest?”  
:Securitisation of European Commission 
Development Aid 
Abstract 
In light of the increased merging of the security and development concepts, this dissertation 
intends to analyse to what extent European Commission development aid has been securitised 
since its era of ‘passivism’ ended at the start of the century. In affirming this occurrence in other 
developed countries, this dissertation explores how and why the Commission has securitised 
their aid. Additional, the ramifications of this process on conceptualising the Commission and its 
degrees of independence will be examined. Given the unique status of the EU, this paper will 
also explore what effects securitisation of European Commission aid has on securitisation theory 






Chapter  One: Introduction 
 
Much of the contemporary debate surrounding development centres on its alleged subrogation to 
the interests of donor’s national security. While questions of donor self-interest have always 
been at the heart of development aid, the trend in the post-Cold War era was to nonetheless focus 
on poverty alleviation in the developing world. However, in the post 11th September 2001 
environment, the emerging concern regarding development aid is its merging with security 
(McDonald, 2004). 
 
This dissertation will argue that there has been a partial shift in donor development policy from 
poverty alleviation to donor (national) security, as of late, and this trend can be recognised in the 
discourse and delivery of European Commission (EC)1 development aid. The case will be made 
that the gradual increase in competency of the Commission in this area, and the securitisation of 
development aid, has wider implications on how to view the European Union (EU) beyond its 
intergovernmentalist conceptualisation as an International Organisation (IO).  
 
Securitisation theory evolved primarily in the mid 1990s, however, the field is still lacking in 
empirical substance (Leonard, 2007,p.73). In addition, while there have been many comments on 
the shift of development aid towards an increased focus on security, the research into this 
                                                          
1 In this dissertation, EC will exclusively be used to represent the European Commission. Where it signifies the 
European Community, the distinction will be made. The European Union (EU) represent the collective body of the 
institutions and it’s 27 member states. 
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occurrence with regards to the European Commission is understudied (Holland, 2002). This 
dissertation aims to fill both of these voids in addition to providing an analysis on the 
aforementioned implications for the EU.  
 
The substantiation of a trend towards securitisation has extensive implications for the developing 
world. The utilisation of development aid to increase the security of donors diverts funds away 
from the alleviation of poverty in developing countries. Michael Brzoska(2008,p.134) notes that 
some academics see it as an attack on the very essence of development as an anti-poverty policy. 
Rita Abrahamsen (2005) concluded that in Africa, securitisation may have damaging 
implications as it subtlety reframes Africa from a humanitarian/development issue to a security 
issue, thus creating suspicion and hostility towards Africa’s people. 
 
Therefore, the overarching research question of this dissertation is, to what extent has the 
European Commission sought to securitise its development aid? Within this, the sub-questions 
this dissertation intends to analyse are; 1.) Has there been a merging of the concepts of 
development and security in the field of development aid? 2.) Has the European Commission 
utilised aid for its security interests? 3.) Can the European Commission be recognised as an 
independent actor in the development field? 4.) What implications does the securitisation of aid 




The dissertation will be structured on three principal chapters. Chapter two will provide an 
overview of development and securitisation theories, and outline how they have merged in 
general. Chapter three will examine the EC’s historical role in the field of development. It will 
then proceed to investigate how the EC’s discourse and delivery of aid has changed to reflect an 
increased security focus. Chapter four questions why the EC has further linked development and 
security. In essence, what are the EC’s motives or is this member state action in disguise? 
Additionally, this chapter will explore the implications of greater securitisation of aid on the 













Chapter Two: Securitisation and Development: In Theory and Practice 
 
Introduction 
Historically, the academic and policy linking of security and development was, for the most part, 
excluded from either discourse. Both fields of study focused on areas that reinforced this 
separation; for example, development studies as a field focused on the negative effects of 
military spending in recipient countries (Brzoska, 2008,p.133). While development aid can be 
seen to have played an indispensable role in swaying developing countries during the Cold War 
to either side of the ideological sphere(Wanlin, 2007), the explicit inclusion of security, beyond 
the geo-political interests of the Cold War, can be recognised in the rethink of development in 
the 1990s(Woods, 2005). Security, in this sense, focused on ‘human security’, as poverty in 
developing countries was increasingly related to conflict(Paris, 2001). Human security, the 
formulation of security in terms of the individual and not territories, as presented in the United 
Nations Human Development Report (1994), was then the clearest linkage yet of development 
and security.  However, in the post September 11th (henceforth 9/11) environment, security is 
increasingly being re-conceptualised to represent the security of the donor. In effect a 
repositioning in part to the Cold War mentality of national security(Suhrke, 2004, McDonald, 
2004). The national security of the donor (henceforth, ‘donor security’) recognised the state as 




Given the historical academic separation of the development and security fields, this chapter will 
overview the changing nature of the development concept and argue that these two fields were 
explicitly linked in the 1990s through human security. The recent theoretical evolution in 
security studies of securitisation will be outlined and defined in terms of this dissertation. 
Thereafter, reasons pertaining to why states give aid will be presented. It will be argued that 
donor self-interest has been, in most cases, a fundamental attribute of providing aid. Thereafter, 
in the post 9/11 environment, it will be argued that a trend has emerged of aid being utilised for 
the security interests of donors, thereby shifting the priorities of aid from human security to 
national security.  
 
Development Theory 
Roger Riddell (2007,p.17) notes that foreign aid is often defined by its purpose; however, to 
understand the purpose, of development aid, it is first necessary to ask the essential question of 
what is development? President Truman’s 1949 inauguration speech is often credited as the 
commencement point of the modern-day development era(Abrahamsen, 2005,p.63, Sachs, 1992). 
President Truman(1949), while initially stating that the primary threat in the world was 
communism, perceived development in economic terms but recognised that “[t]heir [developing 
countries] poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas”; in 
essence, linking United States (US) development and stability to the economic and democratic 
development of the wider world.  
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The early focus of development concentrated on the reduction of poverty in the South primarily 
through the promotion of economic growth(Duffield, 2001,p.23). Development, in this sense, or 
otherwise known as Modernisation Theory, was seen as developing countries following the same 
growth path as pioneered by Western nations(McKay, 2004,p.186). Proponents of this view, for 
example Walt Rostow(1960), understood development in a linear economic fashion that was 
measured through such narrow indicators as Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Des Gasper 
(2004,p.28) notes that in its crudest form, development equates to economic growth. However, 
this narrow understanding of development raised criticisms from other academics. David Hulme 
and Andrew Shepherd(2003,p.403) noted that it understood “the poor as a single homogeneous 
group whose primary problem is low monetary income and has led policymakers and their 
advisors to search for ‘the policy’ that increases the income of ‘the poor’”. John McKay 
(2004,p.189) remarks that new theories on development emerged in the 1960s due to the 
persistent failure of developing countries to actually develop. These theories looked at wider 
development issues such as the structure of the international system in dependency theory; or the 
expansion on this idea in World Systems theory; or proponents of ‘wider development’ posit the 
expansion of freedom to the individual2. 
 
However, over time new theories developed, with two of them being prominent today; Neo-
Liberalism and Human Development. The former emerged in the 1980s and can be seen as a 
resurgence of modernisation theory. It proposes the liberalisation of international trade and sees 
development in economic terms that occurs through market and private investment. It requires 
                                                          
2 For Dependency Theory see Raul Prebisch (1959); World Systems Theory see Immanuel Wallerstein (2004);  
Wider Development (also Human Development Theory) see Amartya Sen (1999). 
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developing nations to undergo structural adjustment programmes to configure their economies to 
the western formats(McKay, 2004, Duffield, 2001,p.29, Hall et al., 2004). This form of 
development was favoured by the US under the idea of the Washington Consensus3. Conversely, 
Human Development posits that “[d]evelopment can be seen... as a process of expanding the real 
freedoms that people enjoy...[f]ocusing on human freedom”(Sen, 1999,p.3). This approach 
emphasises the improvement in individual capabilities(Riddell, 2007,p.133-4). It considers other 
factors beyond the economic progress such as the ability to attain education, health and security. 
Moreover, security, in this sense, is the concern of the individual; human security. It is measured 
by the Human Development Index from the United Nations (UN), with the 1994 report being a 
turning point in linking development and (human) security. 
 
Human security came to prominence in the mid 1990s, owning to it being seen as an alternative 
to the narrow economic growth models of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was 
developed in tandem with many other security theories as academics began to analyse security 
beyond the traditional state centric military approach that was dominant, and rarely challenged, 
during the Cold War(Paris, 2001, Wæver, 1995). One such theory, developed primarily by Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), is securitisation 
theory. This theory has sought to ‘broaden’ and ‘deepen’ the security concept, however, the state 
remaining as the primary object; a fundamental disparity from human security. The next section 
will present a theoretical overview of securitisation and define it in terms of this dissertation. 
                                                          
3 The Washington Consensus, as developed by John Williamson, are a set of market-orientated reforms for sluggish 
states to utilise for development (see Maxwell 2005; Clift 2003). 
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Securitisation Theory 
While still recognising security in terms of ‘survival’, the Copenhagen School (CS) has sought to 
‘broaden’ the understanding of security to consider issues of the state beyond the militarily realm 
such as environmental, economic, societal and political issues. In addition this theory has sought 
to ‘deepen’ the security concept by considering the influence other actors beyond the state have 
on security, such as individuals and international organisations (Buzan et al., 1998, Williams, 
2003, Wæver, 1995). 
 
In securitization theory, security is not regarded as an objective condition but as the outcome of a 
specific social process(Williams, 2003,p.513).The act of securitising an issue is a social 
construct. As initially posited by Wæver(1995), security is established as a speech act. That by 
simply uttering the word an individual moves a particular issue into a specific area and claims 
the right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (Wæver, 1995,p.55). The CS plot issues 
within a three staged spectrum; non-politicised, politicised and securitised. The act of 
securitising moves an issue beyond the realm of politics to the latter stage and a securitising 
agent claims a right to treat an issue by extraordinary means(Buzan et al., 1998,p.26). However, 
the securitising act should not been seen as a positive. The CS appreciates that the act itself can 
have negative connotations. Wæver(1995,p.56-7) seeks to reposition the traditional debate from 
what or whom threatens to should a phenomenon be treated as a security issue in the first place, 
as the act itself frames an ‘other’ in a negative light in the mind of the audience. Michael 
Williams(2003,p.523) affirms that casting an issue in security terms potentially risks contrasting 
the ‘other’ in Schmitten terms of either friend or enemy.  
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Buzan et al (1998) stipulate that in order for a securitising act to be effective they require the 
approval of the relevant audience4. The facilitating condition of this approval is dependent on; 
(1) the speech act following the grammar of security; (2) the securitiser having a level of 
authority for which the audience will believe the claims to be valid; (3) the threat can be 
validated through demonstrable ‘evidence’. They go on to state that a successful securitisation 
has three components; (1) it is framed as an existential threat; (2) thus requiring emergency 
action; (3) the binding rules between securitiser and audience are affected thus permitting the 
act(Buzan et al., 1998). 
 
Thierry Balzacq(2005,p.172) criticises the CS’s approach as it conceptualises security as a 
conventional procedure and the felicity circumstances hold a high degree of formality.  
Balzacq(2005), Abrahamsen(2005) and Bigo (2002) see securitisation as a gradual process along 
a more open-ended spectrum from normalcy to risk, where an issue can be placed on the security 
agenda without it being recognised as an immediate existential threat. Accordingly, the 
conditions of success for a securitising act are less meticulous. In this light, securitisation is seen 
as a process and not as a rigid structure as presented by the CS. Moreover, Ralf 
Emmers(2004,p.6) is critical of securitisation being solely understood as a speech act. According 
to Emmers, securitisation has two dimensions; discursive (speech act) and non-discursive (policy 
implementation and action). 
                                                          
4 The audience is the designated group that the securitising agent seeks to convince as they have the power of 
approval for a specific action (Buzan et al,p.41). 
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Conceptualising securitisation as a singular discursive act in strict three point structure, as the CS 
seeks to, limits the operational ability of the theory as it would only conform to near perfect 
events. Therefore, this dissertation, taking in the criticisms of the theory, understands 
securitisation as a gradual process to remove an issue from the political sphere that involves both 
discursive and non-discursive actions where an existential threat is not mandatory for an issue to 
be securitised.  
 
Given the analysis of development and securitisation theory, the next section will seek to answer 
the question ‘why give aid?’ by analysing the donor motives. Subsequently, development aid 




President Truman’s speech is considered to be the commencement of the modern era in 
development and consequently, development aid. However, aid had existed before.  
Riddell(2007,p.24) notes that the United Kingdom (UK) and France both provided aid to their 
colonies in the 1920s and 1940s. Therefore, while President Truman’s speech was not a 
revolution in designing a new concept, it did shape the existing concept. It conveyed the idea 
more broadly to the developed world and beyond aid solely to colonial territories. The principal 
that underpins foreign aid, according to Riddell(2007,p.1), is “[t]hose who can should help those 
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who are in extreme need”. The underlying assumption of this principal is that it is the donor’s 
responsibility to selflessly help. Initially, US aid cannot be seen in this light. President 
Truman(1949) stated that the motives for US assistance lay in helping poor people “realize their 
aspirations for a better life”. However, this ‘better life’ was underpinned in a capitalist nature and 
posited communism as the threat. Additionally, President Truman(1949,para. 46 & 55) linked 
the success of these developing countries to the success and security of the US.  Consequentially, 
any aid that was provided went to nations supporting US views(Thorbecke, 2000, Aderinwale, 
2006). As aid is rarely given solely for altruistic reasons(Berthelemy, 2005), when examining 
aid, it is essential to understand the motives of the donor as they can often conflict with the 
altruistic principal Riddell proposes.  
 
Riddell(2007,p.91-2) outlines eight motives in donor decisions to give aid; (1) to help address 
emergency needs; (2) to assist recipients achieve their development goals; (3) to show solidarity; 
(4) to further the donor national political and strategic interests; (5) to help promote donor-
country commercial interests; (6) historical/colonial ties; (7) to strengthen global public goods; 
(8) aid based on human rights decisions. While simultaneously appeasing to many motives, most 
donors have strong tenets to a few.   The UK and France have traditionally been large sponsors 
to their former colonies; in 2006, eight of their top ten recipients of aid were former 
colonies(OECD, 2008b). Scandinavian aid is focused towards reaching the poverty goals of their 
target countries(Cox et al., 2000). In this regard, Scandinavian aid is often rated highly for its 
effectiveness by the Commitment to Development Index(CGD, 2007) while other countries 
receive a unfavourable review; US, Italy and Japan. Aid from these countries is often criticised 
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for being highly tied5, with a principal focus on developing donor commercial interests and/or 
dependent on national, political and strategic interests(Shah, 2008, Riddell, 2007, Otter, 2003). 
Unsurprisingly, these motives can be recognised in the donor’s public discourse and delivery of 
aid. Taro Aso (2006), the then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that aid was given to 
enhance the Japanese national interests and that the first use of the Japanese people’s money was 
to benefit the Japanese later on. US aid is also explicit in stating that its purpose is to “furthering 
America's foreign policy interests”(USAID, 2008). This discourse is reflected in the delivery of 
their respective aid. Japanese aid is highly concentrated around East Asia and highly tied to 
Japanese companies and interests(OECD, 1999). During the 1980s and 1990s US aid was greatly 
linked to the promotion of the Washington Consensus. With the exception of US special interest 
in Egypt and Israel, Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (2000) note that US aid in the 1990s was 
focused on poverty, democracy promotion and encouraging economic openness. In addition, 
over 70% of US aid has been tied to promoting US commercial interests to the extent that this 




Craig Burnside and David Dollar(2000) concluded that when aid is given with a high regard for 
donor self-interest then it is often ineffective in achieving development. Accordingly, in such 
incidents, aid can be seen as a foreign policy tool of donors. Jean-Claude Berthelemy (2005) 
                                                          
5 Tied aid is aid with a donor stipulation on where the money must be spent (invariably in the donor country). It is 
estimated to cut the value of aid by 25-40% (United Nations 2004: see also Deen 2004). 
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concurs and in his study notes that all donors, with the possible exception of Switzerland, are 
egoistic in the delivery of their aid to differing degrees. Riddell(2007,p.17) remarks that 
definitions of aid are driven and shaped by those (invariably donors) who have an interest in 
particular types and forms of aid. Therefore, any definition of aid is dependent on the motives of 
donors and will have a self-interested edge to it. Consequently, in defining development aid, this 
dissertation seeks to utilise the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) definition. The definition is not absolute, as it is formulated by the members of the 30 
developed countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD and, 
therefore, donor driven. However, it is widely cited, reached by consensus by the major donors 
and utilised by the UN. OECD defines Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as: 
“Grants or Loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients 
(developing countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of 
economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms 
[if a loan, having a Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]. In addition to financial 
flows, Technical Co-operation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for military 
purposes are excluded ... Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations 
or insurance payouts) are in general not counted.”(OECD, No Date) 
 
This definition is still contested by certain members of the OECD. Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGO) are concerned as some OECD member states seek to expand the definition 
to incorporate additional donor security spending (BOND, 2006). Since all OECD members are 
committed to meeting the UN Resolution 2626 in 1970 of providing 0.7% of their Gross 
National Income (GNI), and currently, as many states are failing, any expansion of ODA would 
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facilitate donors in achieving this goal(United Nations, 1970, Riddell, 2007, Brzoska, 2008). By 
linking development aid to conflict, some donors want to include spending on the removal of 
landmines, prevention of child soldiers and even international peacekeeping. British Overseas 
NGOs for Development (BOND) (2006) is concerned that the inclusion of military/security costs 
into ODA would permit a diversion of funds away from non-strategic countries. Furthermore, the 
use of ODA to meet the security objectives of ‘donors’ reframes a military/security action in 
terms of a development/humanitarian act; thereby, securitising aid and making it more 
acceptable to the public (or audience). 
 
Riddell(2007,p.103) affirms that aid is a tool used by the donor to promote development. During 
the Cold War the different sides of the ideological divide used aid as a self-serving tool to 
promote their conception of development, establish commercial interests and/or as a coercive 
instrument(Robinson et al., 2000,p.2). The fall of the Berlin Wall did not change this(Hjertholm 
et al., 2000). Donors focused their aid toward either the Washington Consensus (USA, IMF and 
World Bank), thereby instilling the neo-liberal model upon developing states, or, to a lesser 
degree, Human Development/Security strategy (Canada, Norway and United Nations). However, 
after 9/11 the focus of donor aid can be seen to have changed (Paris, 2001, Reality of Aid, 2002, 
Aderinwale, 2006, Brzoska, 2008). Donors became increasingly concerned with the security of 
their own state. The early proponents of human security have shown little interest in the topic 
post-9/11(Suhrke, 2004) as academics questioned the usefulness of the concept and policy 
makers had difficulty applying it6. Moreover, by framing the referent object as the individual, 
                                                          
6 See Security Dialogue 2004, 35(3), for a wide range debate into the theoretical and practical usefulness of human 
security. 
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many of the self-interest motives outlined above are redundant. Donors refocused aid from the 
external promotion of Western ideas on development to more inwardly looking policies that 
sought to protect the donor from external security threats. This process, of refocusing aid 
towards the security of the donor, has been termed the securitisation of development 
aid(Aderinwale, 2006, Bagoyoko et al., 2007). The final section will now link the two previous 
theoretical concepts with a contemporary analysis of development aid.  
 
Security and Development 
The development economists of the Cold War era held that development was a precondition for 
security; in essence, with economic prosperity came security. However, after the Rwandan 
genocide, a country that was considered an aid darling previously, human security proponents 
argued the opposite(Krause et al., 2005p.455-6). Debate regarding the primacy of either facet 
over the other illustrates the merging of the two fields in the 1990s and led to the increased 
discussion on the security-development nexus. David Chandler(2007,p.365) cites the nexus as a 
fashionable way of depicting the increased linkage between security and development. The 
International Peace Academy (IPA) sought to balance the debate in affirming that both were co-
conditioned on the other; “[l]ong-term development is regarded as hinging upon security, and 
lasting security depends upon sustainable development”(Hurwitz et al., 2004,p.1). Thus, the 
security-development nexus becomes an inseparable and mutually reinforcing 
relationship(Aning, 2007,p.4).  
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Nonetheless, as Ngaire Woods(2005,p.393) asserted “[a]fter 9/11 the global security agenda 
shifted” and with it the interests of donors. While human security sought to position the 
individual as the referent object, post 9/11 donors refocused towards the recipient state7. With 
the greater belief that ‘their security effects my security’, in line with the earlier Truman 
Doctrine, and terrorism being linked to poverty; donor interest changed to enhancing their own 
security through strengthening the security of recipient countries (see OECD, 2003, DFID, 2005, 
Ardenne, 2005). Security is still conceived as a precondition for development, but, in a state 
centric manner and not of the individual. By donors framing recipient countries as the source of 
existential threats, they securitised aid, thus permitting the utilisation of aid beyond its traditional 
scope, consequently, serving the security self-interest of the donor. Boosting the volume of aid 
was no longer seen as the only way to eradicate world poverty, but as ‘a non-military response’ 
to international terrorism (Carbone, 2005,p.125). Consequently, donor aid policy shifted to 
include security interests and none more so than US foreign aid. While the 2002 National 
Security Strategy placed development aid at the forefront of US foreign policy, on par with 
defence and diplomacy, the OECD(2006) criticises the US for not making poverty reduction a 
primary objective of US foreign policy. Riddle(2007,p.95) notes that for many this blurred the 
distinction between aid for development and aid for national interests. In 2004, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID)(2004,p.7) declared that their role was “a vital 
cornerstone of national security”, thus attempting to advance their value to, but moreover, 
protect their role in US foreign policy as development agencies have increasingly been actively 
engaging with security related matters to safeguard their own existence(Youngs, 2007, Duffield, 
2001). While USAID has been aligning itself closer to US national interests, their relative 
                                                          
7 See Charlotte Bunch (2003) on the set back of human security and the resurgence in national security post 9/11. 
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control of US ODA has fallen. While charted in 1961 as the primary US agency for managing 
US aid (OECD, 1998b), in 2005, USAID controlled 38% of US ODA, down from 50% in 2002. 
In the same period, the US Department of Defence management of ODA rose from 5% to 
21%(OECD, 2006).  In addition, even the make-up and direction of US aid has changed as it 
repositions itself closer to national interests. In 2005, over 7% of USAID’s budget was devoted 
to counter terrorism initiatives, a seven-fold increase on the previous year (Padilla et al., 2006). 
Despite the fact that US aid to Africa has increased since 9/11, Ayodele Aderinwale(2006) notes 
that “[m]ost of American aid to African countries is security related and aimed at furthering the 
war on terror”. Pre 9/11, the US utilised aid as an instrument of foreign policy coercion. 
Yemen’s no vote on the UN Security Council’s approval of the 1990 US action in Kuwait was 
immediately ‘rewarded’ with all US aid being suspended(Deen, 2002). US aid as an instrument 
of coercion continued after 9/11. Kwesi Aning(2007-8) observes how the US used aid (and the 
threat of violence) to attain Pakistani support in the “war on terror”. In the six years before 9/11, 
Pakistan received $245 million in ODA from the US; in the same period after 9/11, they received 
$3450 million8. US ODA, which was central to Congressional budget cut politics of the 1990s 
(Milner et al., 2006), is now insulated from such debates as it directly seeks to serve its own 
security interests. 
 
This phenomenon of aid used for the national security interests of the donor is not exclusive to 
America. The trend can also be seen in aid from Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Japan, and 
UK (Kiyokazu, 2004, Padilla and Tomlinson, 2006, Woods, 2005, Spillane, 2003). However, 
                                                          
8 Own workings from OECD(2008) CRE Database. All US allocations to Pakistan in 2001 included in post-9/11. 
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this is a trend; it is not a revolution in the use of aid. Aid has always had an element of self-
interest but, in post-9/11 there has been a greater enhancement on this trait. Nevertheless, 
poverty alleviation, in line with the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG), is still the 
substantial element of donor aid(Hayman, 2007,p.371). The Netherlands, for example, have 
applied an integrated approach of simultaneously serving their own security interests and 
meeting other wider development goals(Ruyssenaars et al., 2006). 
 
 It is fundamental for democratic governments to have a development aid policy to at least 
appease the public(Otter, 2003). In general, however, the public has little knowledge of the 
particulars of this policy and hence, its mere existence is enough to satisfy them, leaving the 
policy formulation in the privy of the political elite(Otter, 2003). Consequentially, this has 
ramifications when considering the securitising agent-audience relationship in securitisation 
theory. If the audience has a limited interest in the area, then the establishment of a strong 
existential threat is not a requirement for the issue to be securitised. With regards to aid, a casual 
link has been made between the beneficial use of aid and the ‘war on terrorism’ in the donor 
discourse(DFID, 2005). Security is now seen as a precondition for development, when 
previously the opposite belief was held(Ball, 2001, Ardenne, 2005). Through positioning 
security first, securitising agents have sought to manipulate aid budgets to meet their geo-
strategic goals. 
 
While the audience has shown little interest in terms of their state’s development policy, when it 
comes to aid from the European Commission, a more complex situation is present. 
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Chapter Three: European Commission Development Aid: Past and Present 
 
Introduction 
It was at the behest of France that the founding treaty of the European Economic Community9, 
the Treaty of Rome (1957), included a section on an external development policy. This policy 
sought to integrate (pool resources) a proportion of member states development aid budgets 
under the EU flag and in theory, under EC control. Initially, the European Development Fund 
(EDF), was established as a preferential trading and economic assistance agreement between the 
EU’s member states and their colonies and territories(European Commission, 2007, Cameron, 
2007,p.158)10. While early direction of the EDF focused on francophone Africa, this changed 
with each enlargement of the EU thereby instilling the national preference of each member state. 
With the UK joining the EU in 1973, the majority of Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific11(ACP) were inaugurated into the Lomé Convention in 1975(Cox et al., 1997). Early 
agreements were negotiated out of a sense of responsibility and this was reflected in the 
favourable trading terms that the developing countries received(Vogt, 2006,p.162). However, 
this is contested by William Zartman(1975,p.325) who noted that the underlining purpose of this 
assistance was for EU countries to retain influence in these countries given that their military and 
                                                          
9 The European Economic Community was renamed the European Union (EU) in 1992 under the Treaty of 
Maastricht. For simplicity, the EU will be used when referring to the organisation before and after the Treaty of 
Maastricht.  
10 EDF agreements were signed, normally on a five year term (however, more recently in ten year cycles), by the EU 
and the participating developing states. While the first agreement has no particular name, later agreements are 
entitled after the cities there were signed in: Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou. See European Union (2007). 
11 See European Commission (2007) for list of countries that are included in the ACP 
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sovereign control was near an end, thereby further instilling the member states self-interests in 
the project. While early agreements were economic in nature, the asymmetric relationship 
between the EU and the ACP permitted the former to gradually impose more political conditions 
on the latter due to their lack of cohesion and relative low development(Hunt, 2003,p.162)12. It is 
upon these conditions today, and in its proportional focus of development aid to the ACP states, 
that the EC has sought to partially securitise its aid in a discursive and non-discursive manner. 
Beyond the ACP agreements, the EC has also implemented different development instruments 
with non-ACP states in Latin America, Asia, Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, which also 
have a partial securitisation focus.  
 
Given the brief historical overview of the EU’s development policy above13, this chapter will 
seek to analyse how the EC securitised ‘its’ proportion of EU aid. In addition, particular focus 
will be given in this chapter, and the next, to the degree of independence the EC has. Firstly, the 
relationship between the EC and the member states in development policy will be discussed 
through a historical analysis of control in the formation of EC policy. The new leadership role 
the EC has attempted to create for itself will be examined. Subsequently, it will be outlined how 




                                                          
12 Note, Hunt (2003) argued that political conditions were always present but in a development ideological manner. 
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Development Policy: Member States versus European Commission 
Understanding the relationship between the EC and the member states in the EU’s development 
policy is crucial because it “represents the oldest form of the international activities of the 
EU”(Vogt, 2006,p.159). Therefore, any commanding role on the part of the EC in this field 
would indicate a primitive form of foreign policy by the EC and consequentially, would have 
ramifications for the understanding of the integration of the EU14. In addition, a greater role for 
the EC would demonstrate the organisations ability to overcome the historic unwillingness of 
states to cede control of their ODA. 
 
Historically, member state interests have been central to the policy direction of EC development 
aid. However, as this section will argue, in recent years it has been an active EC that has 
increasingly asserted itself in directing the focus of its own aid. Nevertheless, this role is 
primarily dependent on the ability of the EC to continually serve the interests of the member 
states and not, as it publicly claims, to provide more effective aid. 
 
Carbone(2005,p.31-5) divides the history of the EC-member state relationship in foreign aid into 
three stages. The first stage posits that from its inception until the mid 1980s, EC policy was 
highly focused on developing regions that member states sought to retain influence in, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 See Carbone (2007) and Holland (2002) for detailed history of EU development policy. 
14 This will be discussed further in chapter four. 
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particularly France15. France was adamant on protecting its interests in its former colonials and 
utilised EC development to that end in the ACP(Cameron, 2007,p.173). The EC, given its then 
intergovernmental nature, followed the policy guidelines of member states, thereby failing to 
establish a distinct role for itself(Cameron, 2007,p.161).  After successive enlargements of the 
EU, from the end of the 1980s until the late 1990s the EC development policy, in rhetoric and 
focus, underwent a profound transformation; Carbone’s(2007,p.32) second stage. French 
hegemony was reduced as Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic states and the UK (also known 
as the northern states) pressed for more conditions on EC aid and sought to widen its focus 
beyond the ACP countries. With the end of the Cold War, aid to Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean became a significant focus of the EC due to the concerns from southern member 
states who sought aid allocations on the basis of domestic political concerns; i.e. migration or 
strong colonial links(Woods, 2005,p.405). This aid was notably more politicised than ACP and, 
significantly, was managed by Directorate General (DG) External Relations, and not by DG 
Development which previously administered aid to this region(Carbone, 2007,p.48). This has led 
to a division of labour within the EC where now three DG’s seek to play an active role in 
development policy; DG Development, DG External Relations, and DG Trade. This internal 
divide will be analysed later with regard to foreign policy security goals.  
 
The third stage commenced in the early 2000s, notably before 9/11, with the emergence of a 
distinct role for the EC and the ending what Carbone(2008b,p.339) described as EC ‘passivism’. 
This stage had its foundations laid in the Treaty of Maastricht, 1992. While the Treaty structural 
                                                          
15Carbone (2007,p.39) states that France ‘hegemony’ captured EC Development policy in the initial stages. Notably, 
every DG Development commissioner from 1958-1984 was French. 
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provided a limited role for the Commission in development policy as it formed part of the second 
pillar16, the intergovernmentalist section, it did legally, for the first time, establish a strong 
constitutional basis for development co-operation policies in the Commission and gave the 
Commission a restricted leadership role(Schrijver, 2005, Colofon, 2007). The Treaty’s three 
main competencies with regard to development policy are: Coherence, Co-ordination and 
Complementarity (Three C’s). The treaty agreed that member states and the Commission would 
seek to co-ordinated their aid; would ensure that there was coherence between their aid policies 
and other policies like agriculture and trade; and that aid from each member state and the EC 
would not conflict with each others thereby seeking to complement each others 
activities(European Commission, 1992). However, there was barely any implementation by 
member states initially. Recognition in their official documents was limited and there was even 
less operation of the agreed competencies in the early years after the treaty’s agreement(Colofon, 
2007). 
 
Preceding the on set of the third stage, the period from 1990-2000 witnessed an increase of close 
to 600% in the EC’s aid budget. Independent of the member states, the EC rose from the 9th 
largest donor to the 3rd largest, with aid distributed all over the world17. This rise was supported 
by claims from the EC that it could achieve greater efficiencies in the delivery of aid. 
Nevertheless, this phenomenal growth was not without its detractors. It spurred on heavy 
criticism by some member states; particularly the UK. Claire Short’s(2000) much cited piece 
                                                          
16 See Simon Hix (2005) for detail on the EU Pillar system. 
17 See OECD CDC database. 
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described the EC as “the worst development agency in the world” for its poor quality and 
delayed delivery of aid, and even went on to threaten to withdraw UK funding for EC 
development policy unless changes were made. Soon afterwards the OECD(2002) referred to the 
EC as a “timid giant” when it came to aid effectiveness and Holland(2002,p.1) lambasted the EC 
for its bureaucratic nature and its policy patchwork. More recently, Mikaela Gavas(2006)18 
affirmed that “EU-15 aid is currently delivered by 16 different sets of development agencies”; 
thereby insinuating that the Commission’s aid is simply an extension of the member states as it 
fails to differentiate itself. In response to the criticism, the EC has actively made efforts to 
transform its development policy. Significantly, this transformation appears19 to have been led 
by the Commission as it sought to further operationalise the Maastricht Treaty’s competencies 
towards the end of the decade with increasing success(Colofon, 2007). The EC declaration on 
development policy in November 2000 cleared up the ambiguity surrounding the competencies 
and the 2006, European Consensus on Development (ECD) (European Commission, 2006), was 
a milestone in defining the role of the EC in development policy(EL-Agraa, 2007,p.507-8). This 
declaration by the EC and the member states significantly utilised the Three C’s and through 
them assigned the EC a leadership role in the EU’s development policy. Hence, the EC has 
repositioned itself away from simply duplicating a dominant member state’s policy. In addition 
to delivery of its own aid, the ECD sought to establish the EC as the primary agent in facilitating 
coordination and harmonisation in the EU, and, promotion of development best practice and 
policy coherence with individual member states. Even though it explicitly states in the ECD that 
the Community’s policy in the sphere of development aid shall be complementary to the policies 
                                                          
18 Gavas analyses the EU aid pre-2004 enlargement. 
19 This will be analysed further in Chapter four. 
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pursued by the member states, Carbone(2007,p.48) affirms that after a previous ECJ ruling, once 
the EC adopts a decision, no member state can undertake actions that will have adverse 
consequences for the development policy pursued by the EC . Thus, a dependent leadership role 
primitively evolves into an authoritarian role. By consequence of the EC’s actorness20 in the 
third stage, the intergovernmental political debate on the direction of EC aid has diminished thus 
affording the EC the opportunity to direct its own aid and influence the policies of member 
states. However, as will be outlined later in this chapter and the next, it has been the focus of aid 
on security related issued that reduced the political sensitivity of EC development aid. 
 
Throughout this, what has remained core to the EC new leadership role has been its ability to 
frame its actions in the interests of the member states. The Cotonou agreement, the latest round 
in the EDF, negotiated by the EC with the ACP states in June 2000, expanded on the Lomé 
agreements to incorporate recipient’s performance of their democratic status and human rights, 
thereby permitting the EC to suspend aid if the recipient fails certain EU standards. In addition, it 
strengthened the EU position on trade; the EU had sought to end the favourable trading terms to 
the ACP states and requested reciprocity on trade agreements in the future with ACP states. On 
security; the EC, as will be discussed, has linked its aid to security interests of the member states, 
and political make up; greater conditions for aid have been placed on human rights and free 
elections in recipient countries, with particular emphasis on border countries of the EU, thereby 
feeding back into security(Carbone, 2007,p.34-7). These conditions, if used as strictly intended 
                                                          
20 Actorness being defined as a level of independent action by the EC. 
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can ensure the better delivery and effectiveness of aid. However, they do open up the possibility 
of ‘legitimising’ the coercive use of aid as a foreign policy tool.  
 
European Commission Aid in post-9/11 
While it is argued above that wider security interests have inherently been present in EC 
development aid through its underlining focus on the interests of member states, in the post 9/11 
environment, these interests have further manifested themselves in a narrowing of security from 
the external to the internal. The 1990s were underpinned by the promotion of the neo-liberal 
structure culminating in a less recipient favoured, and more coercive, Cotonou agreement with 
the ACP(Hunt, 2003), thereby enhancing the external economic promotion and success of the 
EU. The events of 9/11 have witnessed a greater refocus of aid towards improving the internal 
security of the donor. The OECD(2007,p.13) was unequivocal in noting the Commission’s 
resolve to play its part, through the use of development aid, in fighting world terrorism after 
9/11. This process, the securitisation of EC aid, occurred both in the discursive and non-
discursive as will be outlined below. 
 
Discursive 
The securitisation of aid, as defined in chapter two, is a process of removing an issue from the 
political sphere that occurs both in the discursive and non-discursive fields. Institutions and 
academics alike have noted the greater inclusion of security matters in EC development policy 
(OECD, 2007, Gavas, 2006, Carbone, 2007, Kovach et al., 2006, Vogt, 2006, Woods, 2005, 
Youngs, 2007). The process of securitising EC aid in the discursive can be recognised in the 
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more recent linkage of security and development, and the formal and informal downgrading of 
DG Development within the Commission. The European Security Strategy (ESS)(The Council of 
the European Union, 2003), which was overseen by Javier Solana, the High Representative for 
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, can be seen as a milestone, or a ‘revolution’ as 
Loisel(2005) prescribes, in subrogating development aid to the security interests of the EU. It 
links the security of Europe to the wider world and affirmed that “security is a precondition for 
development” and noticeably does not mention the reverse possibility, thus taking a firm stance 
in the security-development nexus. While Henri Vogt(2006,p.168) notes that the logic of this 
shift is based on that premise that “underdevelopment, poverty, and desperation tend to breed 
violence, in the worst case terrorism, and there can be no development without security and 
political stability”, he affirms that it is more important to recognise how local insecurity can 
materialise itself in Europe, thereby underpinning the interest donors retain in giving aid. The 
ECD(European Commission, 2006)  sought to rebalance the security-development nexus by 
noting that “[w]ithout peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, 
and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur”. However, 
when compared against the EU’s statements to assist vulnerable countries in enhancing their 
counter-terrorism capabilities at the 2004 Madrid Council(Gavas, 2006), the inclusion of “the 
war on terror” in the latest EDF agreement with the ACP(Kovach and Wilks, 2006), and the 
open recognition by Louis Michel(2005), the Commissioner for DG Development, on the 
implications that security and terrorism have had on development policy post 9/11, any attempt 
to rebalance the nexus in ECD are only fleeting.  
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The formal and informal downgrading of the DG Development in the Commission only further 
emphasises the subrogation of aid to security. Carbone(2008b,p.330) notes that EC development 
policy is a “soft policy” and is vulnerable to more powerful interests. After the Seville reforms in 
June 2002, the autonomous EU’s Development Council, which dealt with development issues, 
was abolished and henceforth incorporated into the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council thus increasing the political direction of development policy(Youngs, 2007,p.15, 
Bretherton et al., 2005,p.114, Lighfoot, 2008). In addition, a common judgment in Brussels is 
that since 9/11 the EC Development Commissioner has progressively been excluded from policy 
deliberations(Youngs, 2007,p.15). This was emphasised in the reduced role DG Development 
played in the latest agreement EDF as the negotiations on the trade section with the ACP, 
previously handled by DG Development, were conducted by DG Trade(Carbone, 2008b,p.336). 
The subsequent inclusion of many issues beyond traditional development issues was cited by one 
commission employee as to have “killed the EU’s development policy”(Vogt, 2006,p.168). 
Therefore, statements by Louis Michel and DG Development on the security-development 
nexus, while moving beyond the traditional conception of development, are recognised as an 
attempt to protect the DG’s own role in development policy(Youngs, 2007,p.8), in similar 
retrospect to USAID (see chapter two). The increase utilisation of security language in EC 
development policy, the downgrading of DG Development and refocus in policy of EC 
development to incorporate more donor security related issues are part of the discursive process 
of securitising aid. In addition to this, securitisation of EC aid occurs in the non-discursive as 





Whilst the grand formation of policy, EC aid’s independence from other interests and DG 
Development’s hierarchical position have changed to reflect the increased security focus of the 
EC, especially in the aftermath of the Madrid and London bombing(Dover, 2008,p.113-4), the 
external rhetoric and delivery of this aid has also changed to reflect an ‘increased’ instability in 
certain countries (indirect security enhancement) or to meet the security goals of the donor 
(direct security enhancement). Indirect Security Enhancement (ISE), as defined here, is the use 
of aid to increase the security/stability in third countries that indirectly increases the security of 
the donor on the premise that ‘their security is my security’; the Truman Doctrine revisited. 
Direct Security Enhancement (DSE) is the use of aid that purposefully seeks to enhance the 
security of the donor.21 This does not delimit aid from also improving the security of the 
recipient too. Often aid given with a security focus will be beneficial to the recipient; however, it 
is frequently not focused towards the most pressing needs of the recipients, and consequently, 
limits its effectiveness in achieving development(Aderinwale, 2006).  
 
Indirect Security Enhancement 
EC aid to Sub-Saharan Africa and further a field have had increased incidents of ISE, 
particularly when placed under the banner of conflict prevention. While the evolution of this 
terminology in itself is a distinct link of security and development, it will be argued below that 
the EC has used aid beyond the conscripts of ODA. Frequently cited is the use of EC aid in 
                                                          
21 What differentiates ISE’s and DSE’s from aid that sought to increase the donor’s security during the Cold War is 
the high focus and directionality of aid in the post-Cold war era. 
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funding of the African Peace Facility (APF). The APF, approved by the EU in 2004, is used to 
fund African Union (AU) peacekeeping operations in Africa, particularly in Burundi, Sudan and 
Chad (McDonald, 2004, Loisel, 2005). However, €250 million budget is financed by shaving 
1.5% of the long term development budget allocations to each African country party to the 
EDF(McDonald, 2004, Gavas, 2006). The APF is not poverty focused and, even after the 
expansion of the ODA term by the OECD to include more conflict relevant issues in 2004, the 
APF is still not considered by the OECD as ODA; in essence, the EC’s development budget is 
funding military peacekeeping operations of the AU(Kovach and Wilks, 2006, Woods, 
2005,p.406). This raised concerns with some member states at the time but was finally approved 
after agreement on it being a one-off measure(McDonald, 2004). Youngs(2007,p.8) affirms that 
it is routinely listed by diplomats as one of the main achievements in the development-security 
linkage and one policy maker, noting the leap since 9/11, even suggests that it would have never 
been agreed five years previously. Hetty Kovach and Alex Wilks(2006) assert that the EDF 
opened up the possibility of this practice of aid funding security being replicated again, 
especially in the proposed Stability Instrument22. Furthermore, the APF as a ‘one-off measure’ 
was overlooked as it was extended, and had its allocation increased to €300 million, in the 2008-
2010 budget. Thus, the willingness of member states to permit the continuation of the APF 
without any significant debate is further evidence of security related aid being removed from the 
EU’s political scope. 
 
                                                          
22 See European Commission (2008b). 
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Further afield, EC aid to the Philippines has been criticised by the European Parliament (EP) for 
its focus on combating terrorism. The EC used development aid to support the Philippines in 
improving the security of their borders. In taking the matter to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), the EP argued that the EC over stepped its mandate in seeking to use aid to implement a 
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 on the fight against terrorism. In its judgement the ECJ 
ruled in favour of the EP and annulled the original decision on funding the project(European 
Court of Justice, 2007). While institutional oversight was upheld in this instance, Shennia 
Spillane(2003) asserts that aid for counter terrorism activities is often incorporated under the 
‘catch all, ill defined’ area of good governance. Therefore, given the marginal role of the EP in 
development policy(Carbone, 2007,p.50), it can reasonably be assumed that there are other EC 
counter terrorism projects that have not received the same oversight. 
 
Direct Security Enhancement 
In the commercial sphere the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 23 and the EDF have 
benefited the business interests of EU companies, thus underpinning EU economic security. 
Robert Dover(2008p.122) notes that the ENP has the explicit aim of shoring up the countries 
involved as it will create a good and stable trading environment between the EU and the ENP 
states. Furthermore, many of the programmes tendered in the ENP and the EDF have been 
awarded to EU companies, thereby providing a measure to boost the profits of EU companies, in 
addition to providing them market access to developing countries(Dover, 2008,p.124, Cameron, 
2007,p.170). 
                                                          
23 See European Commission (2008a) for details of the Mediterranean and East European states involved. 
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EC aid to the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, the ‘near abroad’, while infrequent during the 
Cold War, took hold in the mid-1990s and can be seen as a representation of DSE. While 
encompassing 11%24 of EC aid in 1987, by 2005 its share had increased to 24% of the total EC 
aid(OECD, 1998a, OECD, 2007).  Consolidated in the ENP in 2004 and under the control of DG 
External Relations, this aid is considered to have a higher degree of politicisation than DG 
Development’s programmes(Carbone, 2007) and the explicit aim of preserving the EU’s security 
in the region(Carbone, 2008a,p.112).  Furthermore, most of the recipients of this aid are middle 
income countries and consequently, the high focus of aid to this region is in conflict with the 
national policies of some member states. For example, the UK aims to deliver 90% of its aid to 
Low Income Countries (LIC) while only 56% of EC aid, less than the OECD average for donors, 
was directed in 2006 to LIC. Furthermore, out of the top ten recipients of EC aid, only two are 
considered by the World Bank as LIC(Rosa, 2006, World Bank, 2008, DFID, 2008). 
Wanlin(2007,p.20), noting that the eradication of poverty is the main objective of EC 
development policy, affirms that the ENP is inconsistent with this objective as it serves the EU’s 
broader political goals of enlargement and enhancing the Union’s own security. Simon 
Maxwell(2006) cites that the EC’s approach is to create a ‘ring of friends’ in the Balkans, 
Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, thereby externalising the immediate border security of 
the Union. Thus, a conflict exists internally in the discursive, i.e. aid for poverty eradication as 
proposed by in the ECD or aid for securing Europe in the ESS, and in the non-discursive with the 
relative high proportion of aid delivery to the ‘near abroad’ of the EU, in line with the goals of 
the ESS.  
                                                          
24 This figure includes EC aid to Middle East. Therefore, the actual figure to the Mediterranean and European region 
would be less. 
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Through conditions on receiving aid, the recipients are obliged to implement certain aspects of 
the acquis communautaire, the principle body of EU law, without the definitive prospect of 
membership(Edwards, 2008). Acceptance of the acquis gradually extraterritorialities EU norms 
and governance on the recipient creating ‘soft security’ as proposed by Sandra Lavenex(2004) , 
and therefore, has the potential to disarm rogue neighbouring countries. In addition, it creates a 
barrier against more volatile states further afield and strengthens, what Edwards(2008,p.47) 
described as the ‘porous’ borders of the EU against international crime, drug and people 
trafficking, and terrorism. In essence, by securing its neighbours, Europe’s secures itself.  The 
DG External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner(quoted in Edwards, 2008,p.47), 
spoke in the same vain when she noted on the agreement of the ENP that “[t]he EU gains 
improved security around its borders. Increased cross border cooperation will help us to tackle 
problems from migration to organized crime. The EU gains because our partners sign up to 
stronger commitments on the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD [Weapons of 
Mass Destruction], and to the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts”. 
 
The ENP seeks to improve the internal social, economic and military security of the EU by 
stemming the flow of migrants into Europe. By providing aid to improve the border controls of 
ENP countries and seeking these countries to enact and enforce stronger laws against third 
nationals (i.e. nationals from non EU or ENP countries), the EC externalises its own internal 
security(see Belguendouz, n.d). For example, in Morocco, the EC highest recipient of aid, one 
third of EC aid in 2003 was channelled towards improving the Moroccan border controls. 
Additional, Alex Kreienbrink(2005) argues that the recent toughening of Moroccan immigration 
laws were as a result of longstanding demands from the EC.   Furthermore, the EC obligates 
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ENP countries, in receipt of aid, to sign readmission agreements, thereby permitting the EU to 
return immigrants to their country of origin or country of transit(see European Commission, 
2005). In support of this policy the EC allocated €250 million to fund anti-migration 
programmes in countries that signed readmission agreements(Mollett, 2004). Fundamentally 
though, by making migratory movements a security issue after 9/1125, the EU framed the 
migrant as a security threat, subsequently securitising the issue and permitting extraordinary 
means in utilising aid to resolve the issue. However, Dover(2008p.114) argues that this is a self-
fulfilling prophecy as it breeds resentment in migrants, thus creating a security threat.   
 
Understanding the European Commission in Securitisation Theory 
The last section detailed the increased incidences of aid focused on the security goals of member 
states. This section will concisely analyse this phenomenon in terms of securitisation theory and 
detail some discrepancies between the theory and its applicability to the EC. As noted in chapter 
two, this dissertation understands securitisation to be the gradual process of removing an issue 
from the political sphere that occurs both in the discursive and non-discursive. The emergence of 
a leadership role for the EC as of late and its ability to quell the previous criticisms of EC aid 
through better serving the interests of member states is the essence of how the EC partial 
removed developed aid from the intergovernmental and member state-institutional politics of the 
past. Moreover, the EC’s(2003,p.1) ability to frame its role as providing for “A Secure Europe in 
a Better World”, as stated in the ESS,  and thereafter, utilising its aid to enhance the direct and 
indirect security of member states in light of the ‘increased’ existential threats post-9/11, further 
                                                          
25See Leonard (2007,p.54). 
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emphasises how the EC, when associating its goals to the security interests of member states, can 
partial remove an issue from the political sphere. Consequently, the EC has been able to create a 
significant role for itself in the delivery of aid. However, this raises some inconsistency with 
securitisation theory.  
 
The EU is the world’s largest donor representing 60% of the world’s total ODA. Individually, 
the EC is the EU’s largest and world’s third largest donor with a budget over $12,300 million in 
2006(OECD, 2008a). Nevertheless, the EU is not a state(Hix, 2005,p.3-4, Siebert, 2002,p.213). It 
does not have a ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion’ nor does it have authorisation to 
directly tax the citizens of the EU. Consequently, the EC is completely dependent on funding 
from member states. This unique status has ramifications for conceptualising the EC in terms of 
the referent audience in securitisation theory. Given the public’s lack of knowledge in the 
particulars of development aid (see Chapter two), and their even less awareness of EC 
development policy compared to national policy(Eurobarometer, 2005), when understanding the 
audience, as per scribed in securitisation theory, it is necessary to look beyond the public to the 
member state governments; in essence, the member state governments are the audience, not the 
public. This immediately presented a barrier for the Commission in seeking a commanding role 
over its policies and aid programmes. A disinterested public are more inclined to ‘approve’ EC 
aid than member states are given the public’s lack of information and direct involvement in the 
decision making process.  
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Moreover, the unique position of the EC has implications for understanding the facilitating 
conditions of securitisation theory. Can the EC securitise aid? With regards to the three 
facilitating conditions outlined in chapter two, the ESS clearly meets the condition of a speech 
act as it follows the grammar of security given the context in which the act is set and it can be 
framed/validated through demonstrable evidence in light of 9/11. However, whether the 
securitiser, the EC, has a level of authority for which the audience will believe the claims to be 
valid is questionable. Given that the EU is not a state and the EC does not have any elective 
mandate, officially the EC does not have any legal level of authority as its powers are derived 
from the member states and ultimately retained by them. In essence, the vital question is what 
understanding do member states, the audience, have of the EC? Do they see it as an institution 
that facilitates intergovernmental bargaining or do they recognise a certain independent level of 
actorness in the EC? Given the leadership role conferred on the EC in the Maastricht Treaty, the 
latter is tentatively true. Additionally, the other key point on this facilitating condition is the 
presence of belief in statements from the EC; thus, questioning the level of trust member states 
have in the institution. Due to brevity, this cannot be explored further here but to affirm that 
utilising respected figures in the construction of statements enhances the belief, and thus, 
acceptability with the member states. Significantly, it is noteworthy to assert that the ESS was 
written by Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), thus bringing a high degree of respectability to the ESS given Solana’s previous 




This chapter has detailed how the Commission’s role evolved from a facilitator of the dominant 
member states to a tentative ‘independent’ leadership role as provided for in the Maastricht 
Treaty and the ECD. From this, the focus of aid, in policy and delivery, from the EC was 
analysed in the post-9/11 environment. In the discursive, through security leveraged policy 
statements and the downgrading of DG Development, and in the non-discursive, through the 
APF and the motives behind the ENP, it was argued that the EC has utilised part of its aid to 
serve the interests of member states. While this chapter has analysed the how question, the vital 
question that remains is why. This will be examined in the next chapter in addition to analysing 












Chapter Four – Motives and Interests in Securitisation of European Commission Development 
Aid   
 
Introduction 
Given the substantial increase in the EC development aid budget in recent years and the 
increasingly distinctive leadership role being played by the EC, as discussed in the last chapter, 
this chapter will outline why member states have permitted / encouraged the pooling of aid under 
EC control.  In addition, the EC leadership role raises questions of how to understand the EC 
through integration theory. Therefore, the conceptual link will be made between the EC 
development policy and European integration, as such a consideration is essential to 
understanding the motivations and rationale behind European policies (Holland, 2002). It will be 
argued here that, like in other areas of EU integration, member states seek to pool their resources 
when it is rational for them to do so and not because of ‘spillovers’ pertaining to other decisions. 
Nevertheless, the Commission does have a role in this process as at times it is the driver towards 
greater integration and has the ability to influence the member states interests through its ‘agenda 
setting’ authority. 
 
This chapter will first outline the motivations for member states in pooling their development aid 
resources and furthermore, the rationale on why the EC in part securitised its aid. Subsequently, a 
step back will be taken to briefly detail EU integration theory in order to make the conceptual 
link between EC development policy and European integration by analysing EC development aid 
through rational choice theory. In summation, the question will be to ask to what degree is this 
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EC’s new role independent from the past? Is this third stage really the end of European 
Commission passivism as proposed by Carbone (2008b,p.339) or is it the member states acting 
in disguise through the European Commission? 
 
Motivations for Integration 
Member States 
In the past, member states motives for integration were attributable to the high degree of 
influence from the intergovernmental bargaining process. In Carbone’s first stage, member states 
motivations for integrating were highly influenced by French demands and, thus, came about 
after the Germans compromised to keep the French ‘happy’. Motivations in the second were 
once again intergovernmental in nature as the northern states sought to widen the focus of aid 
after the fall of the Soviet Union (Hewitt and Whiteman 2003). The third stage is, conversely, an 
exception due to the more prominent role the EC has sought to play, thus, limiting the 
intergovernmental process of the past. While the EC can provide certain ‘added value’ that no 
single member state can supply, there are certain sacrifices that member states are required to 
undergo if the EC is to be effective. These costs will be outlined below and, subsequently, the 
EC’s capacity to overcome them will be detailed.  
   
There are few incentives for member states to pool their development aid budgets under the EU 
flag. Development aid is often seen as part of a member states foreign policy. Therefore, states 
have traditionally been reluctant to cede sovereignty in this area(Maxwell, 2006,p.3). 
Furthermore, Aurore Wanlin(2007,p.1-13) cites that the principal obstacle in advancing Europe’s 
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development aid lies with member states unwillingness to relinquish a potential coercive foreign 
policy instrument and the positive internal and external visibility benefits they solely receive in 
giving aid. The immediate benefits of integrating aid are weak when compared to what must be 
relinquished, especially since nearly all states have shown a certain degree of self-interest in the 
direction of their aid(Berthelemy, 2005). When utilising a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits from 
the self-interest view of integrating aid primarily amount to permitting a greater impact in EU 
foreign policy. However, this foreign policy is owned by each member state. Therefore, it must 
be agreed through intergovernmental bargaining, thus not guarantying a preferred outcome for 
each involved. On the other hand, the benefits from an altruistic standpoint of integrating include 
greater cohesion and coordination of EU aid thus, increasing the effectiveness of aid on the 
recipient, eliminating many duplication costs between the different donors and providing a centre 
for expertise and best practice in development; what, collectively, the EC(2006) explicitly 
describes as its ‘added value’ to member states. From either standpoint, the costs of integrating 
outweigh the benefits; unless every member is absolutely intent on pursuing an altruistic course, 
unlikely given Berthelemy’s conclusions, or their foreign policy goals are identical. Furthermore, 
subrogating control to a supranational institution condors up a paradox as to the benefits member 
states hope to achieve since the EC aspires to an altruist status in the delivery of aid through best 







An internal conflict exists in the EC with regards to its public discourse on aid policy and in 
delivery of aid. While DG Development aims more to the altruistic motive of eradicating poverty 
through increasing the proportion of its aid to the Least Developed Countries (LDC) (see ECD), 
DG External Relations attains to the more selfish concept of utilising aid in securing Europe (see 
ESS). In practice, a greater proportion of EC bilateral aid goes to Middle Income 
Countries(MIC) than most other members of the OECD DAC(OECD, 2008a)26. This, in addition 
to the incidences of aid for security related projects outlined in chapter three, portrays the EC, in 
part, as a self-interested donor. With this in mind, it must be recognised that given the diverse 
nature of member state foreign policy goals, it is highly unlikely the EC will be able to achieve 
complete integration in EU aid as achieved in other fields such as the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). 
 
As it will be argued below, it has been the EC ability to frame its policy in the self-interest of 
donors, through securitising its aid, which led to continuing integration of member states aid 
policies. However, this approach of serving the interests of member states also serves the pro-
integrationist EC27, thus conceptualising the EC as a power seeking institution. Increased 
                                                          
26 Own workings. 
27 The EC as ‘pro-integration’ is often assumed by many academics without consideration, with the notable 
exception of Christophe Crombez(1997) (Majone 2001). However, Fabio Franchino (2007,p.140-9) statistically 
analysis supports the original hypothesis that, in general, the Commission is pro-integration. 
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integration in the EU permits the EC to act beyond the normal institutional boundaries thus 
deriving an expanded role for the EC28. 
 
The EC ability to frame the direction of its aid to the self-interest of the member states has been 
vital to its success and not the ‘added value’ items it proclaims, since its effectiveness in delivery 
of aid, while improving(House of Lords, 2004), has been rated poorly by the OECD(2002). Even 
Alexander Baum, Head of Unit of DG Development, noted that the EC policy needed a sense of 
self-interest for it to survive(Latt, 2004). Consequentially, the EC’s new ‘independent’ role is 
dependent on serving the interests of member states. However, this is not the continuation of 
member state dominance of EC policy as in stage one and two, but, the emergence of an active 
Commission/‘policy entrepreneur’ that can set the agenda in policy formation thus framing the 
context and influencing the outcome. In summation, the EC must satisfy the interests of member 
states if it is to survive, but the EC can influence these interests through its ability to set the 
agenda and discretion in implementation. This division of authority raises questions on how to 





                                                          
28 See Pollack (2003) for further reading on agency ability of the EC through its authority to set the EU agenda, its 
role as guardian of the Treaties and its discretion in implementing EU policies. 
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Integration Theory 
Early debate on European integration theory was divided between neofunctionalists and 
intergovernmentalists. Seen as the first grand theory of European integration in the late 1950s 
(Hix, 2005,p.14), neofunctionalists posited that integration is a gradual and self-sustaining 
process(Pollack, 2001) thus, leading to the occurrence of ‘spillovers’ from other policy areas in 
order to meet the initial goal. For example, with regards to development aid, in order for this 
policy to be more effective it is argued that reform/spillover in the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) is necessary(Bigsten, 2007).  Neofunctionalists further that the driving forces behind 
integration are non-state actors; the European Commission, European Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice. Neofunctionalists failure to explain the slowdown in European 
integration in the 1960s lead to the emergence of intergovernmentalism, derived from the realist 
school, which argued that integration was driven from the actions and interests of nations states 
with non-state actors having a limited role(Hix, 2005,p.15). In a broad sense, this theory best 
represents the EC-member state relationship in the first and second stages of EC development 
policy as it was hindered by intergovernmental politics.  
 
More recently, liberal-intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance have risen as moderate 
advances from the initial grand theories. The former, as developed by Andrew Moravcsik, places 
the state as the key actor where integration is realised through interstate bargaining. 
Governments are considered to be influenced by their domestic settings and supranational 
institutions (non-state actors) having a limited role(Hix, 2005,p.16). In this regard, 
Holland(2002,p.237) notes the change in scope of DG Development after each enlargement and 
the requirement for member states to sign off on EDF agreements as aspects of 
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intergovernmentalism with the EC development policy. Multi-level governance identifies a range 
of actors across different policy areas that are dependent on each other to variant degrees. 
Moreover, it posits that member states share decision making  authority with some supranational 
institutions and therefore, states cannot guarantee desired outcomes as they are constrained by 
these institutions and domestic interests and influences(Holland, 2002,p.239)29. 
Holland(2002,p.240) cites the role the EP played in the on-mass resignation of the EC in 1999 as 
a representation of multi-level governance. 
 
The EC, Development Aid and Rational Choice Theory 
Neither liberal-intergovernmentalism nor multi-level governance accurately conceptualise the 
EC’s relationship with member states as the former does not take into account the influence the 
EC has on the outcome of EU decisions and the latter over-emphasises the power/authority the 
EC has in the decision process. Rational Choice Theory (RCT), however, can be seen as a bridge 
between the aforementioned theories(Schneider et al., 1994) because, as  Pollack(1997,p.101) 
argued, it transcended the grand theoretical debates by acknowledging the initial primacy of the 
member states (RTC’s intergovernmental characteristic) in addition to recognising the ability of 
supranational institutions to attain, in Kenneth Shepsle words, “structure-induced equilibrium”; 
the process of supranational institutions, though their agenda setting powers, narrowing the 
outcomes and structuring the voting powers of decision makers (RTC’s multi-level governance 
characteristic). While this is not a ‘grand theory’ through which to conceptualise all aspects the 
of EU, in this incidence, given the recent activism on the part of the EC and its defined 
                                                          
29 See Rosamond (2000) for further details on theories of European integration.  
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leadership role in the Maastricht Treaty and the ECD, it is the pre-eminent theory in 
understanding the relationship between the EC and member states in European development 
policies. 
 
As noted above, there is little incentive for member states to integrate based on a simply cost-
benefit analysis. Moreover, it is the member states, sometimes in co-operation with the EP, that 
make the decisions of high politics and set the policy, thus leaving the EC with little formal 
power(Peterson et al., 1999, Cassidy, n.d). However, the EC has engaged in structure-induced 
equilibrium. Through securitising aid, the EC has been able to create a valuable interest to the 
member states, this reframing continued integration in a positive light for member states. 
Consequently, this changes the benefit aspect of the analysis. In addition, to achieving the EC’s 
‘added value’ dimensions, the provision of security to member states induces a rational decision 
on their part to integrate. In light of 9/11, the EC has been able to frame the need for increased 
security against existential threats in correlation with the ‘war of terror’ thus encouraging the EC 
to engage in structure-induced equilibrium. This summation is reliant on a certain degree of 
independent actorness from the EC. It has been argued throughout this dissertation that in the 
third stage of EC development policy, the EC has asserted itself to achieve a tentative 
independent role. This role will now be scrutinised further to determine if indeed this is the EC 





Member States in Disguise?  
It has been argued above that in this third stage of EC development policy, the EC can be seen to 
exert a significant degree of independence in the formation and direction of its aid. However, this 
independence is dependent on the EC serving the interests of member states, but these interests 
been influenced by the EC through its agenda setting authority. This final section seeks to open 
the debate on how independent is the EC really? This section seeks to understand to what extent 
is this new distinct role of the EC’s permitting it to exert its independence or is it the member 
states acting through the EC, for reasons that will be outlined, to achieve their national goals. 
EC-member state situations will be examined here through a more speculative prism with 
substantiation in empirical data. Due to brevity, this concept will not be analysed here from point 
of view of firmness of oversight controls that member states have on the EC. For further analysis 
from this angle see Pollack(2003). 
 
While outlined earlier the ‘added-value’ of integrating through the EC, there remains certain 
other benefits that would make it advantageous for member states to channel their aid through 
the Commission in seeking certain national priorities, thus hollowing out the independent role of 
the EC. Aid from certain member states can often carry a certain degree of colonial baggage that 
limits its effectiveness, whether that be altruistic or coercive, in the recipient country. The House 
of Lords(2004,p.35) report into EC aid notes the advantages EC aid has over certain bilateral aid 
as “it is easier for the Commission to impose conditions without this appearing “neo-colonial” ”.  
Vogt(2006,p.172-3) noted from his interviews that Commission officials found it much easier to 
get access to state executives in recipient countries as an EU bureaucrat than as a representative 
of a member state. Consequently, this has led to certain incidences of member states using the 
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EC as a front to achieve their goals. When France dominated EC development policy, 
Vogt(2006,p.173) notes that France used the relative neutrality of EC development aid “as a 
means to retain their influence in the world”.  
 
To what extent this activity of using the EC as a front to achieve the direct goals of member 
states is difficult to determine. However, Woods analysis of UK and EC aid to Afghanistan 
appears to be one aspect of a member state acting in disguise. Woods(2005,p.405) notes that in 
attempting to meet its public service agreement of 90% of bilateral aid from the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DfID) directed to LIC’s, UK development aid 
channelled through the EC is increasingly been focused towards meeting new security 
imperatives. Thus, the EC is being used as a front for UK security related aid. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that EC aid to Afghanistan has increased nine fold from 2000 to 2006(OECD, 
2008a), thus a representation of what Woods(2005,p.407) affirms as the greater susceptibility of 
EC aid to member state demands than recipient needs. 
 
Nevertheless, to maintain that the recent emergence of EC leadership is in reality member states 
in disguise is a difficult hypothesis to prove given the degree of leadership and oversight that the 
EC obtained in the ECD. Furthermore, given the recent expansion of the EU to 27 member states 
and the diverse views held by Northern, Southern and now Eastern regions of the EU on the 
focus of aid as outlined by Gavas (2006), it is very implausible for any one, or small number of, 
member state(s) to dominate EC development policy as in the past. However, as outlined above, 
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incidences of powerful member states intermittently influencing the focus of aid cannot be ruled 
out; thus, limiting the independence of the EC.   
 
In summation, the EC’s era of ‘passivism’ has ended. However, the era of ‘activism’ is not as 
independent as some campaigners have argued for30. As discussed above, there is little rationale 
for member states to integrate aid under the leadership of the EC as a consensus among the 
member states is improbable. However, it has been the EC’s ability to frame its policy in the 
self-interest of donors, through securitisation of aid, thus creating a broad consensus, which 
formulates a positive rational choice to integrate on the part of the member states. This broad 
consensus is dependent on EC aid serving an aspect of each member state’s foreign policy goals; 
in this case security. Further integration is unlikely, unless the existential threat can be proven to 
be imminent, as it further limits the foreign policy tools of each member state and achieving 
consensus in development aid beyond security is improbable. Nevertheless, the present situation 
portrays the EC’s independence as dependent on what degree it serves the interests of member 
states. However, infrequently member states can continue to supersede the EC to partial refocus 
towards their own goals as seen in the UK case above. Nonetheless, given the understudied 
nature of the field (Holland, 2002), further empirical research is required to substantiate to what 
degree the EC must serve the interests of member states and how this correlate to the level of aid 
they give. 
 
                                                          
30 Maxwell (2006) argued for greater independence for EC and up to 80% of member state’s aid channelled through 
the EC rather than the present 20%. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
There are a number of broad conclusions that can be drawn from this dissertation. Chapter two 
set out to argue that there has been a merging of the development and security concepts in line 
with the general academic literature. However, as sometimes missed or omitted by some 
academics, this merging initially occurred through human security. This opened up possible 
fruitful avenues of progress between the two fields as by framing the referent object as the 
individual and not the state, the self-interest motives of the donor were, in many cases, 
redundant. However, in the post-9/11 era, the global security agenda shifted and with it donors 
interests. In this respects, it was argued that developed states in general sought to utilise their aid 
for their own security interests. Government agencies, for example USAID, engaged in this 
process as a measure to protect its role vis-à-vis the American government. Consequently, when 
aligned to security interests, in the US case at least, development aid proved to be insulated from 
congressional politics. However, to what degree this aid can be classified accurately be classified 
as ‘development aid’ is debatable.     
 
Chapter three argued that the EC, emerging from its intergovernmental past, established a 
leadership role that sought to distinguish itself from solely being an additional provider of aid on 
top of the member states. The three core competencies of this leadership role were cohesion, 
cooperation and complementarity. Upon these, the EC established its ‘added value’ to the 
member states’ role. While viewed as foreign policy instrument and not solely based on the EC’s 
primary objective of poverty eradication (OECD, 2007,p.24), EC aid sought to align itself to the 
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interests of member states. Given the events of 9/11, it was argued that the EC framed its aid in 
mitigating the increased existential threats that the member states faced by focusing its aid on 
programmes that had either a positive direct or indirect effect on the EU’s internal security. This 
process of securitisation of EC aid occurred both in the discursive and non-discursive. By 
serving the security interests of member states, it partially removed EC development policy from 
the general politics of the EU. This was illustrated in the continuation of the APF, a programme, 
funded from the development budget but not considered ODA by the OECD, which caused a 
great deal of controversy in its initial approval. Furthermore, the disproportional funding of the 
ENP relative to other developing countries and its explicit endorsement by the DG External 
Relations commissioner as serving the security interests of the EU is but yet another example of 
securitisation. Finally, the case was made that securitisation of aid in the EC has ramifications 
for understanding securitisation theory. Given the unique status of the EU and the public’s lack 
of knowledge of EC development policy, it was argued that the member state is most 
appropriately defined as the audience in terms of securitisation theory, especially considering its 
previous direct involvement in the policy. 
 
In the last principal chapter of this dissertation, the reasons why member states continued to 
integrate development aid were outlined given the considerable costs, beyond monetary, that 
were involved. It was concluded that by framing its aid against an existential threat and then 
securitising its aid, the EC aligned itself to the interests of member states. Furthermore, by 
serving the interests of member states, the EC served its own interests of continued integration of 
aid under its control. Thus, this permits the EC to act beyond the normal institutional boundaries 
of international organisations. Moreover, conceptualising the EC through Rational Choice 
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Theory, it was argued that the EC, through its powers of agenda setting, has the ability to 
influence the high decisions of member states. From this, it was deduced that the independence 
of the EC in development policy was dependent on it serving the interests of member states, but 
these interests being influenced by the EC.   
 
EC development policy and the role the EC commands have, in some respects, changed 
dramatically since its formation at the Treaty of Rome. Included after a compromise to France, it 
now represents one of the foremost areas of EC leadership in external relations. 
Intergovernmental bargaining has passed on to supranational leadership, thus re-conceptualising 
the EU. However, in other respects, there has been very little change. Aid is still utilised for the 
interests of donors, merely now on a more grand and effective way. Only aid’s terms of 
reference have changed, be it aid for ideological support during the Cold War, economic 
integration in the 1990s or internal security of the donor now; the underlying interests remain the 
same. The EC, encouraged on by some member states, and not by others, has shown some signs 
of providing aid in the primary interests of the recipients; however, in other instances, as outlined 
in this dissertation, it has been for the member states or possibly for itself. Given that EC 
activism in this field has only come about in recent years, the jury is still out with regards to the 
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